EDMO Reading LIst on Countering Disinformation

 Reading List published by European Digital Media Observatory  ( EDMO )

1) Establish a permanent body, independent of governments and platforms, with an EU-wide network of centers with a focus on preparing for and responding to ongoing and emergency information challenges

Chlebna, Camilla, and James Simmie. 2018. ‘New Technological Path Creation and the Role of Institutions in Different Geo-Political Spaces’. European Planning Studies 26(5): 969–87.

Khanna, Tarun. ‘When Technology Gets Ahead of Society’. Harvard Business Review July-August 2018: 88–95.

2) Build a networked infrastructure for educating people about disinformation and media literacy

Cortesi, Sandra et al. 2020. ‘Youth and Digital Citizenship+ (Plus): Understanding Skills for a Digital World’. Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society. https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/42638976 (June 15, 2022).

Edwards, Lee et al. 2021. Rapid Evidence Assessment on Online Misinformation and Media Literacy: Final Report ForOfcom. Ofcom. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/110866/2/rapid_assessment_on_online_misinformation_and_media_literacy_puvblished.pdf (June 15, 2022).

Howard, Philip et al. 2021. Digital Misinformation / Disinformation and Children. UNICEF’s Office of Global Insight and Policy. Rapid Analysis. https://www.unicef.org/globalinsight/media/2096/file/UNICEF-Global-Insight-Digital-Mis-Disinformation-and-Children-2021.pdf (June 15, 2022).

UNESCO. 2022. ‘Why Mother Language-Based Education Is Essential’. https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/why-mother-language-based-education-essential (June 15, 2022).

3) Require platforms to share data around different types of content, by signing on to the Code of Conduct around Platform-to-Researcher data access

Allen, Jeff. 2022. The Integrity Institute’s Analysis of Facebook’s Widely Viewed Content Report. https://integrityinstitute.org/widely-viewed-content-analysis-tracking-dashboard (June 15, 2022).

Bontcheva, Kalina et al. 2020. Balancing Act: Countering Digital Disinformation While Respecting Freedom of Expression. Broadband Commission Research Report on ‘Freedom of Expression and Addressing Disinformation on the Internet’. International Telecommunication Union (ITU). https://www.broadbandcommission.org/Documents/working-groups/FoE_Disinfo_Report.pdf (June 15, 2022).

Deloitte. 2020. ‘Develop Real-Time Sensing / Red Flag Reporting Dashboard’. https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/about-deloitte/articles/develop-real-time-sensing-red-flag-reporting-dashboard.html (June 15, 2022).

European Parliament. Directorate General for Parliamentary Research Services. 2019. Automated Tackling of Disinformation: Major Challenges Ahead. LU: Publications Office. https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2861/368879 (June 20, 2022).

Pasquetto, Irene, Briony Swire-Thompson, and Michelle A. Amazeen. 2020. ‘Tackling Misinformation: What Researchers Could Do with Social Media Data’. Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review. https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/tackling-misinformation-what-researchers-could-do-with-social-media-data/ (June 17, 2022).

4) Ensure that technology companies enforce their policies in terms of prohibiting ad funded disinformation, utilizing the expertise of independent and neutral third parties and the appointment of an independent auditor

Bayer, Judit et al. 2021. Disinformation and Propaganda: Impact on the Functioning of the Rule of Law and Democratic Processes in the EU and Its Member States: – 2021 Update –. European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653633/EXPO_STU(2021)653633_EN.pdf (June 15, 2022).

Fagan, Craig, and Lucas Wright. 2020. Research Brief: Ad Tech Fuels Disinformation Sites in Europe – The Numbers and Players. Global Disinformation Index. https://aej.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/GDI_Adtech_EU.pdf (June 15, 2022).

Global Disinformation Index staff. 2019. The Quarter Billion Dollar Question: How Is Disinformation Gaming Ad Tech? Global Disinformation Index. https://www.disinformationindex.org/research/2019-9-1-the-quarter-billion-dollar-question-how-is-disinformation-gaming-ad-tech/ (June 15, 2022).

Melford, Clare, and Craig Fagan. 2019. Cutting the Funding of Disinformation: The Ad-Tech Solution. Global Disinformation Index. https://www.disinformationindex.org/research/2019-5-1-cutting-the-funding-of-disinformation-the-ad-tech-solution/ (June 15, 2022).

5) Construct media monitoring systems sophisticated enough to capture the flows of disinformation across the whole of the information environment in multiple languages

Allen, Jennifer, Baird Howland, Markus Mobius, David Rothschild, and Duncan J. Watts. 2020. “Evaluating the Fake News Problem at the Scale of the Information Ecosystem.” Science Advances 6 (14)

Benaissa Pedriza, Samia. 2021. ‘Sources, Channels and Strategies of Disinformation in the 2020 US Election: Social Networks, Traditional Media and Political Candidates’. Journalism and Media 2(4): 605–24.

Evanega, Sarah, Mark Lynas, Jordan Adams, and Karinne Smolenyak. ‘Coronavirus Misinformation: Quantifying Sources and Themes in the COVID-19 “Infodemic”’. https://allianceforscience.cornell.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Evanega-et-al-Coronavirus-misinformation-submitted_07_23_20-1.pdf (June 15, 2022).

Tsfati, Yariv, H. G. Boomgaarden, J. Strömbäck, R. Vliegenthart, A. Damstra, and E. Lindgren. 2020. “Causes and Consequences of Mainstream Media Dissemination of Fake News: Literature Review and Synthesis.” Annals of the International Communication Association 44 (2): 157–73.

Unesco: Journalism, fake news & disinformation: handbook for journalism education and training, 2018 https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000265552

6) Enforce policies to protect journalists and strengthen media freedom

Council of Europe Committee of Ministers. 1996. ‘OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS TO MEMBER STATES ON THE PROTECTION OF JOURNALISTS IN SITUATIONS OF CONFLICT AND TENSION’. https://rm.coe.int/16804ff5a1 (June 15, 2022).

Council of Europe. 2015. ‘Recommendations and Declarations of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in the Field of Media and Information Society’. https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680645b44 (June 15, 2022).

Council of Europe. 2022. ‘Not a Target – the Need to Reinforce the Safety of Journalists Covering Conflicts’. https://www.coe.int/en/web/kyiv/-/not-a-target-the-need-to-reinforce-the-safety-of-journalists-covering-conflicts (June 15, 2022).

EU Recommendation on the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists; 2021 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/recommendation-protection-safety-and-empowerment-journalists#:~:text=Adopted%20in%20September%202021%2C%20the,intimidation%2C%20whether%20online%20or%20offline.

7) Implement policies for transparent decision making around content removal to ensure there are agreed-upon standards and processes for archiving content and data so it can be used and understood by prosecutors, policymakers, journalists, fact-checkers, researchers and historians

Abrahams, Fred. ‘When War Crimes Evidence Disappears: Social Media Companies Can Preserve Proof of Abuses’. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/25/when-war-crimes-evidence-disappears (June 15, 2022).

Al Khatib, Hadi, and Dia Kayyali. 2019. ‘YouTube Is Erasing History’. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/23/opinion/syria-youtube-content-moderation.html?referringSource=articleShare (June 15, 2022).

Dubberley, Sam, Alexa Koenig, and Daragh Murray, eds. 2020a. ‘How to Preserve Open Source Information Effectively’. In Digital Witness: Using Open Source Information for Human Rights Investigation, Documentation, and Accountability, Oxford New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Human Rights Center at UC Berkeley School of Law. 2021. DIGITAL LOCKERS: Archiving Social Media Evidence of Atrocity Crimes. Human Rights Center at UC Berkeley School of Law. https://humanrights.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/digital_lockers_report5.pdf (June 15, 2022).

Human Rights Watch. 2020. “Video Unavailable” Social Media Platforms Remove Evidence of War Crimes. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/09/10/video-unavailable/social-media-platforms-remove-evidence-war-crimes (June 15, 2022).

8) Put in place funding and support for the mental health and well-being of researchers, fact-checkers and journalists working on war reporting and disinformation investigations

Dubberley, Sam, and Michele Grant. 2017. Journalism and Vicarious Trauma. A Guide for Journalists, Editors and News Organisations. First Draft. https://firstdraftnews.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/vicarioustrauma.pdf (June 15, 2022).

Dubberley, Sam, Elizabeth Griffin, and Haluk Mert Bal. 2015. Making Secondary Trauma a Primary Issue. A Study of Eyewitness Media and Vicarious Trauma on the Digital Frontline. Eyewitness Media Hub. http://eyewitnessmediahub.com/uploads/browser/files/Trauma%20Report.pdf (June 15, 2022).

Ellis, Hannah. 2018. ‘How to Prevent, Identify and Address Vicarious Trauma — While Conducting Open Source Investigations in the Middle East’. bell¿ngat. https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/how-tos/2018/10/18/prevent-identify-address-vicarious-trauma-conducting-open-source-investigations-middle-east/.

9) Develop new ethical frameworks for civil society and government initiatives working to fight disinformation

Association for Computing Machinery. 2018. ‘ACM Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct’. https://www.acm.org/code-of-ethics (June 15, 2022).

The Media Councils Debates. Facing the Challenges of the Digital Age, January 

2022 https://www.lecdj.be/de/projekte/media-councils-in-digital-age/–

Pancake, Cherri M. 2018. ‘Programmers Need Ethics When Designing the Technologies That Influence People’s Lives’. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/programmers-need-ethics-when-designing-the-technologies-that-influence-peoples-lives-100802 (June 15, 2022).

Stanford University. 2015. ‘Computer and Information Ethics’. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/ethics-computer/#InfRicInfPoo (July 15, 2022).

10) Build an EU-wide pipeline of researchers, university centers, journalists, fact-checkers and other civil society groups with the necessary technical, linguistic and subject-matter knowledge to respond quickly to future information challenges

Bisson, Robin. 2022. ‘Academia Urged to Join Fight against Online Misinformation’. *Research. https://www.researchprofessionalnews.com/rr-news-uk-charities-and-societies-2022-1-academia-urged-to-join-fight-against-online-misinformation/ (June 15, 2022).

CBInsights. 2018. Who Will Lead The Fight Against Online Disinformation & Propaganda? https://www.cbinsights.com/research/fighting-online-disinformation-propaganda-conference/ (June 15, 2022).

Iaione, Christian. 2021. ‘Enabling Co-Governance CO4CITIES THIRD TRANSNATIONAL MEETING 25-26 November 2021’. http://www.comune.torino.it/benicomuni/bm~doc/iaione_co4cities-budapest.pdf (June 15, 2022).

Jukić, Tina et al. 2019. ‘Collaborative Innovation in Public Administration: Theoretical Background and Research Trends of Co-Production and Co-Creation’. Administrative Sciences 9(4): 90.

https://edmo.eu/publications/10-recommendations-by-the-taskforce-on-disinformation-and-the-war-in-ukraine/#pst-conclusionsrent site

What is NATO doing to counter Hybrid THreats?

 From May 7, 2024 update

• The primary responsibility to respond to hybrid threats or attacks rests with the targeted country.
• NATO Allies have strengthened their national resilience, including against hybrid threats, and have improved their ability to understand the hybrid threat picture across the Alliance, particularly the sophisticated hybrid strategies used by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China.
• NATO is prepared to assist any Ally against hybrid threats as part of collective defence. The Alliance has developed a strategy for its role in countering hybrid warfare to help address these threats.
• Since 2016, the Alliance has publicly stated that hybrid actions against one or more Allies could lead to a decision to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
• In July 2018, NATO Leaders agreed to set up counter-hybrid support teams, which provide tailored targeted assistance to Allies upon their request, in preparing against and responding to hybrid activities.
• In July 2022, NATO Leaders endorsed comprehensive preventive and response options to counter hybrid threats. These can be tailored to address specific situations.
• NATO is strengthening its coordination with partners, including the European Union, in efforts to counter hybrid threats.
• NATO’s Joint Intelligence and Security Division has a hybrid analysis branch that helps improve situational awareness.
• The Alliance actively counters disinformation and propaganda – not with more propaganda, but with facts – online, on air and in print.

May 7, 2024

NATO Center

 

Have the Boleshvik Brain Beans contaminated our Soup?

 The Social Media explosion over the last 2 decades equipped Russian hybrid warfare specialists with next generation weapons for their ongoing information operations. They are skilled, experienced, and their tactical skills are subtle and effective. Research has shown that educated, confident social media users believe they are not susceptible to troll influence.  Recent polls and social media responses  to events in Israel, Gaza, Ukraine and the Horn of Africa demonstrate a shift across traditional  demographic lines.

So.. 

Have the Bolshevik Brain Beans contaminated our Soup?

Probably, but how?

References

https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/03/09/russia-putin-disinformation-propaganda-hybrid-war/

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10676-023-09717-7

https://www.jwc.nato.int/application/files/7216/9804/8564/CognitiveWarfare.pdf

Home of Veshom Cavalry Regiment

venamur et scimus hostem movere

"We Hunt and know the Enemy as He moves"

Who we are:

A small group that supports Information Operators by hunting and watching the enemy as he moves. We gather immediately actionable and long range information about groups working to undermine Democracies which are accountable to its people. 

• We operate in the OSINT environment
• we notify vetted Information Operators about what enemies of democracy are saying, doing, and estimates about their real intentions by  finding them, watching them when they do not move, how they react to an operation.
• We expose them to the public and to information operators for more direct action.
• We operate ahead of on the flanks and rear of information operating groups, equivalent to a reconnaissance or cavalry missions

Equipped

• we are more equipped for surveillance and recognizance than mass attacking
• we avoid becoming decisively engaged by passing on the fight to another group
• this allows us to keep our digital eyes on the enemy
• We are a much smaller team of specialists than the fighting groups we serve
• We are experienced bonkers who have learned to find and track the enemy

Operations

• Once vetted "Scouts" we work anonymously in chats
• independently, in pairs or small groups
• OSINT surveillance in a specialty areas 
• Reports systematically and as needed to larger groups
• Conducts Bonks and reporting for rules violations only if  timely actions is required, then moved away.
• meet together anonymously in private chat forums to exchange information for collective analysis so we can pass it on as as Unit report

If  you have some skills and/or willing to learn and  occasionally participate in group projects like this,

DM @VCGScout06 "Interested in More info"

Battle Planning and Operations with 100 Km of the Zero Line: post Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Exec summary. 

Battle planning and operations require adjustments based on what we have learned from the  Russian invasion of Ukraine. The scope of this paper is to spatially explore100 km either side of the zero line, in the direction of  battle from Orbital heights to Undersea depths. We want to look at Pre, during and post battle time periods. and explore the following activities in each segmented space:

• Command and Control
• Units active in the space
• Control measures
• Activities
• coordination and spatial deconfliction
• Degraded mode operational planning at every level and system

What are the  plan Prep Phases?

• Staff Analysis
• Commanders Guidance
• Staff Planning
• MEta

• 
  
• Planning the battle
• Intelligence Preparation
• Preparing the battle field
• Preparing the forces
• Preparing the Supply Chain
• Rehearsal & Adjustment

What are the Relative Zero Lines segments? ( forward & Backward )

Support

0 - 100 Enemy Orbital Recon & Surveillance

0-20 Resource Support C5 enemy Recon & Surveillance

0-10 Tactical support C5, enemy Recon & Surveillance

Battle

0 (LOC)

0+10 Maneuver

Disruption

0+ 20 Enemy Tactical support Recon

0+40 Recon  & Surveillance

0 + 100 Orbital Recon & Surveillance

What are the Weapon Coordination Dimensions?

Air   (High to Low Physical Space)

• Tactical Drones
• Tactical Aircraft 
• High altitude Air Defense
• High altitude Missile
• Loitering munition operations
• Tactical Artillery
• Orbital
• Communication
• Frequency Spectrum
• WIFI/Bluetooth

Ground  

• Armor
• Infantry
• Engineers
• Air Defense
• Ground Support Drone support
• Ground  Support Artillery
• Ground Force Launched loitering munitions 
• Ground  Support Air Defense
• Ground  Support CAS
• Communication
• Frequency Spectrum
• WIFI/Bluetooth

Sea 

•  

Cognitive-Information

• Deception
• Social-Media
• Psychological operations
• Civil
• Information operations

 https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/april/cognitive-warfare-maneuvering-human-dimension

NAFO

 

North Atlantic Fella Organization

The North Atlantic Fella Organization (NAFO, French: Organisation des Fella de l'Atlantique nord, OFAN, a play on NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) is an Internet meme and social media movement dedicated to countering Russian propaganda and disinformation about the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.^[1][2][3][4] It has been categorised as a form of information warfare.^[2]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NAFO_(group)

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/01/nafo-ukraine-russia/ https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/19/world/middleeast/ukraine-memes-russia-fundraising.html https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-internet-army-of-nafo-fellas-fights-russian-trolls-and-rewards-donors-with-dogs-11664271002 https://www.politico.eu/article/nafo-doge-shiba-russia-putin-ukraine-twitter-trolling-social-media-meme/ https://www.dw.com/en/nafo-ukraines-info-warriors-battling-russian-trolls/a-63124443 https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/11/europe/ukraine-nafo-russian-trolls-intl/index.html https://www.wired.com/story/ukraine-war-trucks-trolls-tourniquets/ https://www.kyivpost.com/post/204 https://kyivindependent.com/making-sense-of-ukrainian-memes-from-watermelons-to-saint-javelin/ https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/06/russia-ukraine-soft-power-culture-diplomacy-fellas-nafo/ https://cepa.org/article/nafos-fellas-must-evolve/ https://gizmodo.com/15-memes-nafo-russia-ukraine-war-trolls-putin-zelensky-1850471235 https://news.usni.org/2023/04/17/feds-investigating-former-sailor-behind-pro-russian-donbass-devushka-accounts https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/08/31/a-virtual-army-of-impish-cartoon-pooches-is-waging-war-on-russia https://www.wired.com/story/take-down-trump-truth-social/

Troll Gardens: Every Activist group now gets Troll Training

 Troll Farms of all kinds are growing because they work, and people are willing to pay for information operations supporting their point of view. Exposing them  has only made them morph into less recognizable forms. with a central control group ands decentralized communicators, they are on both the Left and  Right and are active in this  2024 election-case. I propose an example group on each side, but there are many

Troll Farms now use a message control group, which analyzes communication momentary trends, develops a response strategy, and then farms the messages out to locally specific volunteers and bots to communicate the counter message.

Campaigns have always gathered supporters to help them communicate their message  Now every politically active groups may be beginning to use tools troll farm tactics with which to weaponize information.

• Dis, Mis, and Mal information Amplification
• Dis, Mis, and Mal information Suppression
• Twists on real information
• Tactics
• Astroturfing
• DARVO
• Glorifying their candidate to
• villainizing their opponent

Two Activist group case studies, both with their own troll farm networks, One Left and one Right 

On the Right

Turning Point USA, 

https://www.tpusa.com/

a non-profit political organization. Turning Point USA's  founder, Charlie Kirk, opened up the Republican National Convention this summer.  

TPUSA is a 501(c)3 non-profit organization whose mission is to identify, educate, train, and organize students to promote freedom.

• Control Group: Web site and Headquarters
• locally specific volunteers: Chapters of Student Groups across the country

On the Left

 ATI / Civic Listening Corps

Through our volunteer network, we operate campaigns to understand and combat misinformation and disinformation impacting our every aspect of our life. We coordinate with stakeholders across advocacy, academia, and journalism sectors to ensure insights are shared and accessible. We are actively monitoring problematic narratives online concerning elections and democracy, public health, climate, civil rights, and international conflict.

• Control Group: algorithmic Transparency Institute (ati ) https://ati.io/
• locally specific volunteers: Civic Listening Corps https://www.civiclistening.org/

As we enter the 2024 election season there is more troll work than ever. I propose legislation that all groups clearly identify themselves in political information operations, and  information disfunction is documented and be subject to neutral part audit with a public release of reports, and violations fined,  since self regulation has not worked.