Apophenia and Cognitive Warfare

Apophenia (/æpoʊˈfiːniə/) is the tendency to perceive meaningful connections between unrelated things.^[1] The term (German: Apophänie from the Greek verb ἀποφαίνειν (apophaínein)) was coined by psychiatrist Klaus Conrad in his 1958 publication on the beginning stages of schizophrenia.^[2] He defined it as "unmotivated seeing of connections [accompanied by] a specific feeling of abnormal meaningfulness".^[3][4] He described the early stages of delusional thought as self-referential over-interpretations of actual sensory perceptions, as opposed to hallucinations.^[1 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apophenia

Cognitive Warfare

Notes

China does not separate war from peace - it is all one state of competition. SO they would say thy are in competition with the West, which includes all kinetic war if it furthers competition

Net

Austrian Military Training 

D.I.M.E Cards

Diplomacy

Information 

Military

Economic

Net;

(UnCODE) system for classifying the goals and methods of Cognitive Warfare.

 

Cognitive Warfare takes advantage of novel developments in technology and science to influence how target populations think and act. 

Establishing adequate defense against Cognitive Warfare requires examination of modus operandi to understand this emerging action space. 

• This includes the goals and methods that can be realized through science and technology. 
• Recent literature suggests that both human and nonhuman cognition should be considered as targets of Cognitive Warfare. 
• There are currently no frameworks allowing for a unified way of conceptualizing short-term and long-term Cognitive Warfare goals and attack methods that are domain-and species-agnostic. 
• There is a need for a framework developed through a bottom-up approach that is informed by neuroscientific principles to capture relevant aspects of cognition. 
• The framework should be at a level of complexity that is actionable to decision-makers in war. 

• In this paper, we attempt to cover the existing gap by proposing the Unplug, Corrupt, disOrganize, Diagnose, Enhance (UnCODE) system for classifying the goals and methods of Cognitive Warfare. 

UnCODE System

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Torvald-The system is neurocentric by conceptualizing Cognitive Warfare goals from the perspective of how adversarial methods relate to neural information processing in an individual or society. The UnCODE system identifies five main classes of goals: 

• 1) Eliminating a target's ability to produce outputs, 
• 2) degrading a target's capacity to process inputs and produce outputs, 
• 3) biasing a target's input-output activity, 
• 4) monitoring and understanding the input-output relationships in targets, and
• 5) enhancing a target's capacity and ability to process inputs and produce outputs. 

Methods can be divided in two categories based on access to the target's neural system: 

The UnCODE system is domain-and species-agnostic and allows for interdisciplinary commensurability when communicating attack paths across domains. 

In sum, the UnCODE system is a unifying framework that captures that multiple methods can be used to reach the same Cognitive Warfare goals.

Methods for reaching CogWar goals.

… 

Generations of Warfare

 

• First generation: tactics of line and column; which developed in the age of the smoothbore musket. Lind describes First Generation of warfare as beginning after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 ending the Thirty Years' War and establishing the state's need to organize and conduct war.^[3] 1GW consisted of tightly ordered soldiers with top-down discipline. These troops would fight in close order and advance slowly. This began to change as the battlefield changed. Old line and column tactics are now considered suicidal as the bow and arrow/sword morphed into the rifle and machine gun.
• Second generation: tactics of linear fire and movement, with reliance on indirect fire. This type of warfare can be seen in the early stages of World War I where there was still strict adherence to drill and discipline of formation and uniform. However, there remained a dependence on artillery and firepower to break the stalemate and move towards a pitched battle.
• Third generation: tactics of infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy's combat forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them; and defense in depth. The 3GW military seeks to bypass the enemy, and attack his rear forward, such as the tactics used by German Stormtroopers in World War I against the British and French in order to break the trench warfare stalemate (Lind 2004). These aspects of 3GW bleed into 4GW as it is also warfare of speed and initiative. However, it targets both military forces and home populations.
• The use of fourth-generation warfare can be traced to the Cold War period, as superpowers and major powers attempted to retain their grip on colonies and captured territories. Unable to withstand direct combat against bombers, tanks, and machine guns, non-state entities used tactics of education/propaganda, movement-building, secrecy, terror, and/or confusion to overcome the technological gap.
• Fourth-generation warfare has often involved an insurgent group or other violent non-state actor trying to implement their own government or reestablish an old government over the current ruling power. 
• However, a non-state entity tends to be more successful when it does not attempt, at least in the short term, to impose its own rule, but tries simply to disorganize and delegitimize the state in which the warfare takes place. 
• The aim is to force the state adversary to expend manpower and money in an attempt to establish order, ideally in such a highhanded way that it merely increases disorder, until the state surrenders or withdraws.
• -Concept by Lind

References

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth-generation_warfare

5th Generation Warfare

Fifth-generation warfare (5GW) is warfare that is conducted primarily through non-kinetic military action, such as social engineering, misinformation, cyberattacks, along with emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and fully autonomous systems.

Fifth generation warfare has been described by Daniel Abbot as a war of "information and perception".^[1]

 There is no widely agreed upon definition of fifth-generation warfare,^[2] and it has been rejected by some scholars, including William S. Lind, who was one of the original theorists of fourth-generation warfare.^[3]

Alex P. Schmid said that fifth-generation warfare is typified by its "omnipresent battlefield", and the fact that people engaged in it do not necessarily use military force, instead employing a mixture of kinetic and non-kinetic force.^[7] 

References

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fifth-generation_warfare

 

CogWar 101

These are notes from various sources, unassembled into what we need: Editor will remove this note when complete:

• 
  
• Cognitive Warfare
• The weaponization of Public opinion by a external entity for the purpose of influenceing public and governmental policy an destabilization public intuitions
• Western
• China  & New Actors
• New Technologies
• Cogwar 2.0

• CogWar focuses on the weaponization of information, including 

System 1 thinking - Fast

System 2 Thinking - Slow

Cognitive Biases

Group level

• Groupthink
• Echo chamber: we share the same information group
• Bubbles

• how adversaries distribute information
• how it is understood, 
• how information influences human 
• thought
• behavior 
• decision making

 OODA decision framework.

The OODA Loop model is a four-point decision loop that supports quick, effective and proactive decision-making. The four stages of the Loop are:

1. Observe – collect current information from as many sources as practically possible.
2. Orient – analyze this information, and use it to update your current reality.
3. Decide – determine a course of action.
4. Act – follow through on your decision.

Warfare process cycles through this loop many times quickly

https://www.mindtools.com/a3ldgz1/ooda-loops

Russia has been studying and applying this for 100 years on its own people, Since 2000 Putin decided He has been a war with the West.

apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1200226.pdf

Troll Farm Set Pieces #1

 The methods used by Russian propaganda described by a Russian journalist:

“I studied at the Faculty of Journalism of Moscow State University. We had a military department. In an atmosphere of secrecy, we were taught special combat propaganda - the art of sowing discord in the ranks of the enemy with the help of disinformation and manipulation of consciousness. Let me tell you, it’s a scary business. I'm not kidding. Combat, or “black,” propaganda allows any distortion of real facts to solve propaganda problems. This is an effective weapon used for the sole purpose of knocking out the enemy’s brains. The "rotten herring" method. The "inverted pyramid" method. The "big lie" method. The “40 to 60” principle. The "absolutely obvious" method. You also know all these methods and techniques. You just don't realize it. As intended. We were taught to use special propaganda techniques against soldiers of the enemy army. Today they are used against the civilian population of our own country. For two years now, reading Russian newspapers or watching television shows, I have noted with interest that people coordinating the distribution and interpretation of news in Russia clearly learned from the same textbook as I have, from the same cheerful colonel or his colleagues. For example, the “rotten herring” method. It works like this. A false accusation is chosen. It is important that it is as dirty and scandalous as possible. For example, petty theft, child molestation, or murder, preferably out of greed work well. The purpose of the “rotten herring” is not to prove the accusation. It’s to cause a wide, public discussion... How it’s unjust and unfair. The human psyche is arranged in such a way that, as soon as the accusation becomes the subject of public discussion, its “supporters” and “opponents”, “experts”, rabid “prosecutors” and ardent “defenders” of the accused inevitably arise. But regardless of their views, all participants in the discussion again and again pronounce the name of the accused in connection with a dirty and scandalous accusation, thus rubbing more and more “rotten herring” into his “clothes”, until finally the “smell” begins to follow him everywhere. The question “killed-stole-seduced or not” becomes the main one when his name is mentioned. Or, for example, the “40 to 60” method invented by Goebbels. It consists in creating media that give 60 percent of their information in the interests of the enemy. On the other hand, having earned his trust in this way, the remaining 40 percent are used for extremely effective, thanks to this trust, disinformation. During World War II, there was a radio station that the anti-fascist world listened to. It was thought to be British. Only after the war did it turn out that it was actually Goebbels’ radio station, which worked on the “40 to 60” principle he developed. The “big lie” method is very effective It is a bit like the “rotten herring” method, but actually works differently. Its essence is to offer the audience such a universal and terrible lie with the highest degree of confidence that it is almost impossible to believe that it's possible to lie about such a thing. The trick here is that a properly composed and well-invented ‘big lie’ causes such a deep emotional trauma in the listener or viewer that it then determines his views for a long time, contrary to any arguments of logic and reason. False descriptions of cruel abuse of children or women work particularly well. Let’s say that the message about a crucified child due to the deep emotional trauma it causes will determine the views of the person who received this information for a long time, no matter how much someone tries to convince him later, using logical arguments. But our cheerful colonel especially revered the method of “absolute evidence”, which delivers, although not fast, but reliable results.”

Source

Translated by @

@NatalkaKyiv

 from a Russian Journalist post on telegram

Pulled off twitter before it disapears

EDMO Reading LIst on Countering Disinformation

 Reading List published by European Digital Media Observatory  ( EDMO )

1) Establish a permanent body, independent of governments and platforms, with an EU-wide network of centers with a focus on preparing for and responding to ongoing and emergency information challenges

Chlebna, Camilla, and James Simmie. 2018. ‘New Technological Path Creation and the Role of Institutions in Different Geo-Political Spaces’. European Planning Studies 26(5): 969–87.

Khanna, Tarun. ‘When Technology Gets Ahead of Society’. Harvard Business Review July-August 2018: 88–95.

2) Build a networked infrastructure for educating people about disinformation and media literacy

Cortesi, Sandra et al. 2020. ‘Youth and Digital Citizenship+ (Plus): Understanding Skills for a Digital World’. Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society. https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/42638976 (June 15, 2022).

Edwards, Lee et al. 2021. Rapid Evidence Assessment on Online Misinformation and Media Literacy: Final Report ForOfcom. Ofcom. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/110866/2/rapid_assessment_on_online_misinformation_and_media_literacy_puvblished.pdf (June 15, 2022).

Howard, Philip et al. 2021. Digital Misinformation / Disinformation and Children. UNICEF’s Office of Global Insight and Policy. Rapid Analysis. https://www.unicef.org/globalinsight/media/2096/file/UNICEF-Global-Insight-Digital-Mis-Disinformation-and-Children-2021.pdf (June 15, 2022).

UNESCO. 2022. ‘Why Mother Language-Based Education Is Essential’. https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/why-mother-language-based-education-essential (June 15, 2022).

3) Require platforms to share data around different types of content, by signing on to the Code of Conduct around Platform-to-Researcher data access

Allen, Jeff. 2022. The Integrity Institute’s Analysis of Facebook’s Widely Viewed Content Report. https://integrityinstitute.org/widely-viewed-content-analysis-tracking-dashboard (June 15, 2022).

Bontcheva, Kalina et al. 2020. Balancing Act: Countering Digital Disinformation While Respecting Freedom of Expression. Broadband Commission Research Report on ‘Freedom of Expression and Addressing Disinformation on the Internet’. International Telecommunication Union (ITU). https://www.broadbandcommission.org/Documents/working-groups/FoE_Disinfo_Report.pdf (June 15, 2022).

Deloitte. 2020. ‘Develop Real-Time Sensing / Red Flag Reporting Dashboard’. https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/about-deloitte/articles/develop-real-time-sensing-red-flag-reporting-dashboard.html (June 15, 2022).

European Parliament. Directorate General for Parliamentary Research Services. 2019. Automated Tackling of Disinformation: Major Challenges Ahead. LU: Publications Office. https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2861/368879 (June 20, 2022).

Pasquetto, Irene, Briony Swire-Thompson, and Michelle A. Amazeen. 2020. ‘Tackling Misinformation: What Researchers Could Do with Social Media Data’. Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review. https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/tackling-misinformation-what-researchers-could-do-with-social-media-data/ (June 17, 2022).

4) Ensure that technology companies enforce their policies in terms of prohibiting ad funded disinformation, utilizing the expertise of independent and neutral third parties and the appointment of an independent auditor

Bayer, Judit et al. 2021. Disinformation and Propaganda: Impact on the Functioning of the Rule of Law and Democratic Processes in the EU and Its Member States: – 2021 Update –. European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653633/EXPO_STU(2021)653633_EN.pdf (June 15, 2022).

Fagan, Craig, and Lucas Wright. 2020. Research Brief: Ad Tech Fuels Disinformation Sites in Europe – The Numbers and Players. Global Disinformation Index. https://aej.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/GDI_Adtech_EU.pdf (June 15, 2022).

Global Disinformation Index staff. 2019. The Quarter Billion Dollar Question: How Is Disinformation Gaming Ad Tech? Global Disinformation Index. https://www.disinformationindex.org/research/2019-9-1-the-quarter-billion-dollar-question-how-is-disinformation-gaming-ad-tech/ (June 15, 2022).

Melford, Clare, and Craig Fagan. 2019. Cutting the Funding of Disinformation: The Ad-Tech Solution. Global Disinformation Index. https://www.disinformationindex.org/research/2019-5-1-cutting-the-funding-of-disinformation-the-ad-tech-solution/ (June 15, 2022).

5) Construct media monitoring systems sophisticated enough to capture the flows of disinformation across the whole of the information environment in multiple languages

Allen, Jennifer, Baird Howland, Markus Mobius, David Rothschild, and Duncan J. Watts. 2020. “Evaluating the Fake News Problem at the Scale of the Information Ecosystem.” Science Advances 6 (14)

Benaissa Pedriza, Samia. 2021. ‘Sources, Channels and Strategies of Disinformation in the 2020 US Election: Social Networks, Traditional Media and Political Candidates’. Journalism and Media 2(4): 605–24.

Evanega, Sarah, Mark Lynas, Jordan Adams, and Karinne Smolenyak. ‘Coronavirus Misinformation: Quantifying Sources and Themes in the COVID-19 “Infodemic”’. https://allianceforscience.cornell.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Evanega-et-al-Coronavirus-misinformation-submitted_07_23_20-1.pdf (June 15, 2022).

Tsfati, Yariv, H. G. Boomgaarden, J. Strömbäck, R. Vliegenthart, A. Damstra, and E. Lindgren. 2020. “Causes and Consequences of Mainstream Media Dissemination of Fake News: Literature Review and Synthesis.” Annals of the International Communication Association 44 (2): 157–73.

Unesco: Journalism, fake news & disinformation: handbook for journalism education and training, 2018 https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000265552

6) Enforce policies to protect journalists and strengthen media freedom

Council of Europe Committee of Ministers. 1996. ‘OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS TO MEMBER STATES ON THE PROTECTION OF JOURNALISTS IN SITUATIONS OF CONFLICT AND TENSION’. https://rm.coe.int/16804ff5a1 (June 15, 2022).

Council of Europe. 2015. ‘Recommendations and Declarations of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in the Field of Media and Information Society’. https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680645b44 (June 15, 2022).

Council of Europe. 2022. ‘Not a Target – the Need to Reinforce the Safety of Journalists Covering Conflicts’. https://www.coe.int/en/web/kyiv/-/not-a-target-the-need-to-reinforce-the-safety-of-journalists-covering-conflicts (June 15, 2022).

EU Recommendation on the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists; 2021 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/recommendation-protection-safety-and-empowerment-journalists#:~:text=Adopted%20in%20September%202021%2C%20the,intimidation%2C%20whether%20online%20or%20offline.

7) Implement policies for transparent decision making around content removal to ensure there are agreed-upon standards and processes for archiving content and data so it can be used and understood by prosecutors, policymakers, journalists, fact-checkers, researchers and historians

Abrahams, Fred. ‘When War Crimes Evidence Disappears: Social Media Companies Can Preserve Proof of Abuses’. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/25/when-war-crimes-evidence-disappears (June 15, 2022).

Al Khatib, Hadi, and Dia Kayyali. 2019. ‘YouTube Is Erasing History’. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/23/opinion/syria-youtube-content-moderation.html?referringSource=articleShare (June 15, 2022).

Dubberley, Sam, Alexa Koenig, and Daragh Murray, eds. 2020a. ‘How to Preserve Open Source Information Effectively’. In Digital Witness: Using Open Source Information for Human Rights Investigation, Documentation, and Accountability, Oxford New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Human Rights Center at UC Berkeley School of Law. 2021. DIGITAL LOCKERS: Archiving Social Media Evidence of Atrocity Crimes. Human Rights Center at UC Berkeley School of Law. https://humanrights.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/digital_lockers_report5.pdf (June 15, 2022).

Human Rights Watch. 2020. “Video Unavailable” Social Media Platforms Remove Evidence of War Crimes. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/09/10/video-unavailable/social-media-platforms-remove-evidence-war-crimes (June 15, 2022).

8) Put in place funding and support for the mental health and well-being of researchers, fact-checkers and journalists working on war reporting and disinformation investigations

Dubberley, Sam, and Michele Grant. 2017. Journalism and Vicarious Trauma. A Guide for Journalists, Editors and News Organisations. First Draft. https://firstdraftnews.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/vicarioustrauma.pdf (June 15, 2022).

Dubberley, Sam, Elizabeth Griffin, and Haluk Mert Bal. 2015. Making Secondary Trauma a Primary Issue. A Study of Eyewitness Media and Vicarious Trauma on the Digital Frontline. Eyewitness Media Hub. http://eyewitnessmediahub.com/uploads/browser/files/Trauma%20Report.pdf (June 15, 2022).

Ellis, Hannah. 2018. ‘How to Prevent, Identify and Address Vicarious Trauma — While Conducting Open Source Investigations in the Middle East’. bell¿ngat. https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/how-tos/2018/10/18/prevent-identify-address-vicarious-trauma-conducting-open-source-investigations-middle-east/.

9) Develop new ethical frameworks for civil society and government initiatives working to fight disinformation

Association for Computing Machinery. 2018. ‘ACM Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct’. https://www.acm.org/code-of-ethics (June 15, 2022).

The Media Councils Debates. Facing the Challenges of the Digital Age, January 

2022 https://www.lecdj.be/de/projekte/media-councils-in-digital-age/–

Pancake, Cherri M. 2018. ‘Programmers Need Ethics When Designing the Technologies That Influence People’s Lives’. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/programmers-need-ethics-when-designing-the-technologies-that-influence-peoples-lives-100802 (June 15, 2022).

Stanford University. 2015. ‘Computer and Information Ethics’. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/ethics-computer/#InfRicInfPoo (July 15, 2022).

10) Build an EU-wide pipeline of researchers, university centers, journalists, fact-checkers and other civil society groups with the necessary technical, linguistic and subject-matter knowledge to respond quickly to future information challenges

Bisson, Robin. 2022. ‘Academia Urged to Join Fight against Online Misinformation’. *Research. https://www.researchprofessionalnews.com/rr-news-uk-charities-and-societies-2022-1-academia-urged-to-join-fight-against-online-misinformation/ (June 15, 2022).

CBInsights. 2018. Who Will Lead The Fight Against Online Disinformation & Propaganda? https://www.cbinsights.com/research/fighting-online-disinformation-propaganda-conference/ (June 15, 2022).

Iaione, Christian. 2021. ‘Enabling Co-Governance CO4CITIES THIRD TRANSNATIONAL MEETING 25-26 November 2021’. http://www.comune.torino.it/benicomuni/bm~doc/iaione_co4cities-budapest.pdf (June 15, 2022).

Jukić, Tina et al. 2019. ‘Collaborative Innovation in Public Administration: Theoretical Background and Research Trends of Co-Production and Co-Creation’. Administrative Sciences 9(4): 90.

https://edmo.eu/publications/10-recommendations-by-the-taskforce-on-disinformation-and-the-war-in-ukraine/#pst-conclusionsrent site

What is NATO doing to counter Hybrid THreats?

 From May 7, 2024 update

• The primary responsibility to respond to hybrid threats or attacks rests with the targeted country.
• NATO Allies have strengthened their national resilience, including against hybrid threats, and have improved their ability to understand the hybrid threat picture across the Alliance, particularly the sophisticated hybrid strategies used by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China.
• NATO is prepared to assist any Ally against hybrid threats as part of collective defence. The Alliance has developed a strategy for its role in countering hybrid warfare to help address these threats.
• Since 2016, the Alliance has publicly stated that hybrid actions against one or more Allies could lead to a decision to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
• In July 2018, NATO Leaders agreed to set up counter-hybrid support teams, which provide tailored targeted assistance to Allies upon their request, in preparing against and responding to hybrid activities.
• In July 2022, NATO Leaders endorsed comprehensive preventive and response options to counter hybrid threats. These can be tailored to address specific situations.
• NATO is strengthening its coordination with partners, including the European Union, in efforts to counter hybrid threats.
• NATO’s Joint Intelligence and Security Division has a hybrid analysis branch that helps improve situational awareness.
• The Alliance actively counters disinformation and propaganda – not with more propaganda, but with facts – online, on air and in print.

May 7, 2024

NATO Center