Cognitive Warfare ( Cogwar )

What it is 

“Cognitive Warfare is a strategy that focuses on altering how a target population thinks and through that how it acts” (Backes & Swab, 2019); “the weaponization of public opinion, by an external entity, for the purpose of (1) influencing public and governmental policy and (2) destabilizing public institutions” (Bernal et al., 2020, p. 10).

 Source: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10676-023-09717-7

• manipulate people’s mental processes, including perception, beliefs, emotions, and decision-making, by employing digital technologies and exploiting human cognitive flaws. 
• Its goal is to change not just what people think but also how they think. 
• CogWar weaponizes narratives to influence policies and destabilize societies by sowing
•  confusion
• amplifying social divisions
• undermining the trust and credibility of democratic states. 
• CogWar is an umbrella term that encompasses various operations, such as 
• information warfare, 
• cyber warfare, 
• psychological warfare, 
• political warfare, and even 
• lawfare

while incorporating aspects of cognitive neuroscience.

https://www.moore.army.mil/infantry/DoctrineSupplement/ATP3-21.8/PDFs/adrp3_0.pdf

Who conducts Cogwar and Where

• Everyone does it:
• Countries'
• Political Parties: Autocrats, Democrats & Republicans
• Protest Movements
• Non Profits
• States, Cities
• Educational institutions
• Religious institutions
• Russia is the most skilled  Practitioners of  Cogwar , but China is spending significant resources to catch up.
• The evolving information space has facilitated the emerging CogWar. This unconventional form of conflict aims to 

Purpose Driven or 

•  Purpose driven cogwar is essential for autocrats and dictators to stay in power, and require both internal and external strategies. 
• Purpose driven cogwar in liberal democracies has both internal and external strategies as well. Internally, there is a competition of persuasion that occurs in elections. 
• The temporary winner of this competition gets the right to lead their people for a season. This same group gets to design the external strategy, which is carried out by both diplomatic and their national security agencies
• The ethics of  Internal cogwar have not been well explored, but

Haphazard Cogwar

• 
  
• Haphazard cogwar happens in any entity that focuses only on kinetic warfare and let the chips fall where they may on other dismissions of hybrid warfare
• Since the

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1 V. Surkov, ‘Dolgoe gosudarstvo Putina’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (11 February 2019). Surkov is an advisor to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

2 EU External Action Service, EEAS Special Report: Disinformation on the Coronavirus — Short Assessment of the Information Environment (19 March 2020), https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-special-report-disinformation-on-the-coronavirus-short-assessment-of-the-information-environment/; EU External Action Service, Video Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers: Remarks by the High Representative Josep Borrell at the Press Conference (23 March 2020), https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/76381/video-conference-foreign-affairs-ministers-remarks-high-representative-josep-borrell-press_en.

3 E.g., ‘Koronavirus: biologicheskaya voina SShA protiv Rossii i Kitaya’, Zvezda (29 January 2020). Zvezda is part of the Russian Ministry of Defence media house. This piece of disinformation echoes the well-known Soviet claim that AIDS was also produced as part of a US biological weapons program.

4 E. Gnezdilova, ‘Informatsionnaya voina: Tekhnologiya ili forma kommunikatsii?’, Strategicheskie kommunikatsii v biznese i politike 4 (2018) p. 109.

5 Ibid., p. 109.

6 V. Gerasimov, ‘Tsennost nauki v predvidenii’, Voenno-promishlenniy kurer (28 February 2013).

7 Ibid.

8 V. Gerasimov, ‘Mir na granyakh voini’, Voenno-promishlenniy kurer (15 March 2017).

9 N. Labush, ‘Indeks aggressivnosti kak kriterii informatsionnoi voini’, Vek informatsii 1(2) (2018) p. 286.

10 Ibid., p. 286.

11 V. Gerasimov, ‘Tsennost nauki v predvidenii’; S. Chekinov and S. Bogdanov, ‘Voennaya strategiya: Vsglyad v budushee’, Voennaya mysl 11 (2016).

12 E.g., L. Kunakova, ‘Informatsionnaya voina kak objekt nauchnogo analiza’, Almanakh sovremennoi nauki i obrazovaniya 6 (2012) pp. 93–96.

13 E.g., V. Novikov and K. Gerasimov, Tekhnologii propagandi (Moscow: Flinta 2019) p. 18. Konstantin Gerasimov is unrelated to Valeriy Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff.

14 S. Popova and V. Fedorinov, ‘Tseli i posledstviya informatsionnoi voini’, Vozhdushno-kosmicheskie sili. Teoriya i praktika 6 (2018) p. 18.

15 K. Akhatova, ‘Meshkulturnaya kommunikatsiya v sovremennykh realiyakh informatsionnogo protivoborstva v mirovoi politike’, Nauchnie trudi KubGTU 4 (2019) pp. 240 and 249.

16 V. Korneev, ‘Problema vospriyatiya telekanala Russia Today v FRG i yego perspektivi na nemetskom mediarinke’, Vek informatsii 5 (2019), no page numbers, www.age-info.com/2019/5.

17 Weaponization is a useful concept. It is also problematic, since we still lack a clear understanding of when and how actions are lifted from the ordinary to the weaponized. For use of the concept, see, e.g., S. Pyastolov, ‘Slovo kak oruzhie’, Informatsionnye voini 1(49) (2019) pp. 17–21.

18 The two processes, which are opposites but also two ends of the same spectrum, can also be described as, for instance, adaptation and learning.

19 E. Gnezdilova, ‘Informatsionnaya voina’, p. 108.

20 These processes build on the policy of ‘reflexive control’, a behavioral tool with a strong pedigree in Soviet and Russian military thinking; see T. Thomas, ‘Russia’s Reflexive Control and the Military’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 17 (2004) pp. 237–56.

21 E.g., I. Speller and C. Tuck, ‘Introduction’, in D. Jordan et al. (eds.), Understanding Modern Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009) p. 1; M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press 1999).

22 E.g., A. Bartosh, Konflikti XXI-ogo veka — Gibridnaya voina i tsvetnaya revolutsiya (Moscow: Goryatyaya linija — Telekom 2018) pp. 10–13.

23 ‘Peshkov razskazal o sostoyanii informatsionnoi voiny v mire’, Interfax (20 December 2018).

24 V. Gerasimov, ‘Mir na granyakh voini’.

25 S. Chekinov and S. Bogdanov, ‘Evolutsiya sushnosti i soderzhaniya ponyatiya “voina” v XXI stoletii’, Voennaya mysl 1 (2017), p. 32.

26 Ibid., p. 38.

27 I. Savadsky, ‘Informatsionnaya voina — shto eto takoe?’, Konfident 4 (1996) pp. 1–14, I. Dilevsky et al., ‘Mezhdunarodniy rezhim nerazprostraneniya informatsionnogo oruzhiya: utopiya ili realnost?’, Voennaya mysl 10 (2014) pp. 3–12; N. Gerasimov and E. Shakirova, ‘Sotsialno-tsetetsentricheskie voini sovremennosti: realnost informatsionnoi epokhi’, Voennaya mysl 10 (2017) pp. 79–87; V. Kapralov and M. Chernyaikov, ‘Vzaimosvyaz ponyatii “antigosudarstvennaya propaganda” i ‘informatsionnaya voina’, Voennaya mysl 1 (2018) pp. 68–73, Ye. Nikulin, A. Sidorin, and O. Ivanov, ‘Radioelektronnaya borba v sukhoputnikh voiskakh vooruzhennikh sil SShA’, Voennaya mysl 11 (2018) 100–09 and Yu. Muratova ‘Sushchnost informatsionnoi voini v regionalnom politicheskom konflikte i osnovnie formi yego proyavleniya’, Kommunikologiya 6(1) (2918) pp. 34–45.

28 E.g., F. Splidsboel Hansen, ‘Russian Influence Operations’, DIIS Policy Brief (2018) pp. 1–4.

29 A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, ‘Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’, Science 185 (1974) pp. 1124–31; D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (London: Penguin 2011).

30 D. Kahneman Thinking, Fast and Slow; M. Haselton, D. Nettle, and D. Murray, ‘The Evolution of Cognitive Bias’, in D. Buss (ed.), Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley 2016) pp. 968–87.

31 S. Kara-Mursa, Manipulyatsiya soznaniem (Moscow: Rodina 2018); V. Novikov and K. Gerasimov, Tekhnologii propagandi; and N. Ignatyuk, Slukhi: Tekhnologii upravleniya (Moscow: Yustitsinform 2018) respectively.

32 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Evolution of the Cyber Domain: The Implications for National and Global Security (London: IISS 2015); M. O’Hanlon, Forecasting Change in Military Technology, 2020–2040 (Washington, DC: Brookings 2018).

33 F. Splidsboel Hansen, ‘Russian Influence Operations’.

34 S. Buntovskiy and M. Tonjan, ‘Informatsionnie ugrozy noveishego vremeni i organi gosudarstvennogo upravleniya’, Aktualnie problemi ekonomi i obshchestva 3 (2019) pp. 18–20.

35 T. Eidelman, Kak raboet propaganda (Moscow: Individuum 2018) pp. 56–59.

36 V. Novikov and K. Gerasimov, Tekhnologii propagandi, p. 85.

37 S. Soroka et al., ‘The Impact of News Photos on Support for Military Action’, Political Communication 33(4) (2916) pp. 563–82; see also D. Domke, D. Perlmutter, and M. Spratt, ‘The Primes of Our Times?’, Journalism 3(2) (2002) pp. 131–59.

38 B. Resnick, ‘We’re Underestimating the Mind-Warping Potential of Fake Video’, Vox (24 July 2018).

39 A. Bartosh, ‘Strategiya i kontstrategiya gibridnoi voini’, Voennaya mysl 10 (2018) p. 5.

40 V. Gerasimov, ‘Tsennost nauki v predvidenii’.

41 J. Lantis and D. Howlett (2010), ‘Strategic Culture’, in J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, and C. Gray (eds.), Strategy in the Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010) pp. 88.

42 J. Lantis and D. Howlett, ‘Strategic Culture’, pp. 88–89.

43 P. Morgan, ‘The Past and Future of Deterrence Theory’, in J. Lindsey and E. Gartzke (eds.), Cross-Domain Deterrence (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2019) pp. 50–65.

44 Ibid.; T. Prior, ‘Resilience: The “Fifth Wave” in the Evolution of Deterrence’, in O. Thränert and M. Zapfe (eds.), Strategic Trends 2018: Key Developments in Global Affairs (Zürich: ETH Zürich 2018) pp. 63–80.

45 ‘Sergei Skripal and the Russian Disinformation Game’, British Broadcasting Corporation (9 September 2018).

46 L. Kunakova, ‘Informatsionnaya voina kak objekt nauchnogo analiza’, p. 95.

47 G. Petrova, ‘Mery protivodeistviya informatsionno-propagandistskim atakam Zapada i voprosy primeneniya konstitutsionnikh osnov gosudarstvennoi ideologii dlya bezopasnosti SMI’, Mezhdunarodnoe sotrudnichestvo yevraziiskikh gosudarstv: politika, ekonomika, pravo 4 (2018) pp. 33–42; I. Goncharov, ‘Teknologii manipulyatsii massovim soznaniem v internete (na primere saita InoSMI’), in S. Akhmetov et al. (eds.), Integrirovannie kommunikatsii v sporte i turizme: Obrazovanie, tendensii, mezhdunarodniy opit (Krasnodar: Kuban State University of Physical Training, Sport and Tourism 2018) pp. 170–75; R. Garifullin, ‘Fenomen neopredelyonnosti v Vikipedii i yego rol v obrazovatelnoj sizteme’, in E. Bakshutoviy, O. Yusupovoi, and E. Dvoinikovoi (eds.), Sbornik nauchnikh trudov (Samara: Samara State Technical University 2018) pp. 12–18.

48 United States Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election (Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office 2019) II, pp. 7–8.

49 See, e.g., P. Letunovskiy and Nikonorov, ‘Sovremenniy informatsionniy ekstremizm kak ugroza natsionalnoi bezopastnosti Rossii’, Etnosotsium 4 (2018) pp. 28–36; I. Goncharov, ‘Teknologii manipulyatsii massovim soznaniem v internete’ on outsourcing and individual bloggers under contract respectively.

50 E.g., Russian investigative journalist Roman Dobrokhotov in ‘Did Putin Win the EU Elections?’, al-Jazeera (28 May 2019).

51 See, e.g., S. Grachev and T. Baranova, ‘Rol “novikh media” v sovremmenikh konfliktakh’, Vestnik Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo oblastnogo universiteta 4 (2018) pp. 33–40; I. Goncharov, ‘Teknologii manipulyatsii massovim soznaniem v internete’.

52 See, e.g., Y. Astakhov, ‘K polemike ob informatsionnikh sadachakh Rossii’, Mezhdunarodnie protsessi 16(2) (2018) pp. 223–32; A. Manoilo, ’Rossiiskiy podkhod k formirovaniyu prostranstva kollektivnoi informatsionnoi bezapasnosti stran BRIKS’, Sotsialnie i gumanitarnie znaniya 4(3) (2018) pp. 156–63.

53 J. Becker, ‘Lessons from Russia’, European Journal of Communication 19(2) (2004) pp. 139–63.

54 F. Splidsboel Hansen, ‘Putins Rusland’, DIIS Long-Read (2019).

55 ‘This Is What Losing Your Newsroom Looks Like in Russia’, Meduza (12 July 2016).

56 ‘Nyet nikakoi obektivnosti’, Kommersant (7 April 2012).

57 Ibid.

58 S. Vosoughi, D. Roy, and S. Aral, ‘The Spread of True and False News Online’, Science 359 (2018) pp. 1146–151.

59 T. Eidelman, Kak raboet propaganda, p. 59.

60 E.g., G. Ramsay and S. Robertshaw, Weaponising News — RT, Sputnik and Targeted Disinformation (London: King’s College 2019); C. Nemr and W. Gangware, Weapons of Mass Distraction (Washington, DC: Park Advisors 2019); see also Antifake (at https://theins.ru/category/antifake) and East Stratcom (at https://euvsdisinfo.eu/).

61 For illustrative examples, see A. Manoilo, ‘“Delo Skripalei” kak operatsiya informatsionnoi voini’, Politologiya 1 (2019) pp. 72–97, Y. Anaeva and K. Godovanyuk, ‘Matryoshka “dela Skripalei”’, Sovremennaya Evropa 3 (2018) pp. 16–26; Yu. Tagiltseva, ‘Strategii i taktiki informatsionno-psikhologicheskoi voini v kontekste rossiisko-britanskikh otnoshenii’, Ekologiya yazika i kommunikativnaya praktika 4 (2018) pp. 92–104.

62 ‘Gde zhivut trolli, i kto ikh kormit’ and ‘Kak stat trollkhanterom’, Novaya Gazeta (9 September 2013) and (11 March 2015) respectively.

63 D. Linvill and P. Warren, ‘Troll Factories: The Internet Research Agency and State-Sponsored Agenda Building’ (2018), http://pwarren.people.clemson.edu/Linvill_Warren_TrollFactory.pdf.

64 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for US National Security (Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office 2018) pp. 44.

65 United States Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, II, pp. 5–46.

66 Ofcom, Ofcom Broadcast and on Demand Bulletin, 369 (12 December 2018).

67 V. Novikov and Gerasimov, Tekhnologii propagandi, p. 55.

68 ‘Nyet nikakoi obektivnosti’, Kommersant.

69 P. Pomerantsev, Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible: Adventures in Modern Russia (London: Faber and Faber 2017).

70 V. Novikov and K. Gerasimov, Tekhnologii propagandi, pp. 50–51.

71 E.g. A. Bartosh, ‘Rasrushitelniy tandem: tsvetnaya revolutsiya — gibridnaya voina’, Nesavisimoe voennoe obozrenie (24 July 2015).

72 V. Novikov and K. Gerasimov, Tekhnologii propagandi, pp. 92 and 51. See also P. Letunovskiy and Nikonorov, ’Sovremenniy informatsionniy ekstremizm’.

73 I. Yablokov, ‘Conspiracy Theories as a Russian Diplomatic Tool: The Case of Russia Today (RT)’, Politics 35(3–4) (2015) pp. 301–15; M. Kragh, E. Andermo, and L. Makashova, ‘Conspiracy Theories in Russian Security Thinking’, Journal of Strategic Studies 43 (2020).

74 G. Ramsay and S. Robertshaw, Weaponising News, pp. 31–33.

75 V. Novikov and K. Gerasimov, Tekhnologii propagandi, p. 39.

76 T. Eidelman, Kak raboet propaganda, pp. 56–58.

77 Ibid., p. 57.

78 E. Gnezdilova, ’Informatsionnaya voina’, p. 110.

79 S. Popova and V. Fedorinov, ‘Tseli i posledstviya informatsionnoi voini’, p. 16.

80 Ye. Tsimbal, ‘Informatsionnaya voina i yego manipulyativnie atributy’, Trudi Rostov State Transport University 3 (2018) p. 69.

81 In S. Popova and V. Fedorinov, ‘Tseli i posledstviya informatsionnoi voini’, p. 19.

82 V. Surkov (writing under the pseudonym Natan Dubovitskiy), ‘Bes neba’, Pioner (12 March 2014).

83 Ibid.

84 F. Splidsboel Hansen, ‘Russia’s Relations With the West: Ontological Security Through Conflict’, Contemporary Politics 22(3) (2016) pp. 359–75.

85 Y. Astakhov, ‘K polemike ob informatsionnikh sadachakh Rossii’, Mezhdunarodnie protsessi 16(2) (2018) pp. 223–32.

86 The Presidential Council on Strategic Development and the National Projects, Natsionalnye proekty: Tselevye pokazateli i osnovnye rezultaty (2019) pp. 29–30.

87 I. Panarin, Informatsionnaya voina i kommunikatsii (Moscow: Goryachaya liniya — Telekom 2018) p. 54.

88 A. Bushkova, ‘Tekhnologii informatsionnogo vozdeistviya na gosudarstvennost Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Puti protivodeistviya’, Gramota 9 (2018) pp. 64.

89 V. Novikov and K. Gerasimov, Tekhnologii propagandi, p. 47.

90 Computational Propaganda Research Project, The IRA, Social Media and Political Polarization in the United States, 2012–2018 (Oxford: University of Oxford 2018) p. 39.

91 Ibid., pp. 6–7.

92 S. Buntovskiy and M. Tonjan, ‘Informatsionnie ugrozy noveishego vremeni’ p. 20; see also Y. Astakhov, ‘K polemike ob informatsionnikh sadachakh Rossii’, p. 231.

93 S. Kara-Mursa, Manipulyatsiya soznaniem, p. 267.

94 Ibid., p. 235.

95 I. Panarin, Informatsionnaya voina i kommunikatsii, pp. 58–59.

96 Y. Astakhov, ‘K polemike ob informatsionnikh sadachakh Rossii’, p. 227.

97 M. Tishin and Y. Polunin, ‘Ugrozy informatsionnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Filo Ariadne 4 (2018), no page numbers.

98 S. Popova and V. Fedorinov, ‘Tseli i posledstviya informatsionnoi voini’, pp. 19–20.

99 Computational Propaganda Research Project, The Global Disinformation Order: 2019 Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation (Oxford: University of Oxford 2019) p. i.

100 Ibid.

101 I. Butusova and I. Sobranskaya, ‘Spetsifika informatsionnykh voin v postindustrialnom obshchestve’, in (no editor) Sotsialno-politicheskie protsessi v menyayushchemshya mire: Meshvuzovskiy sbornik nauchnykh trudov (Tver: Tver State University 2018) p. 42.

102 Manoilo ‘Rossiiskiy podkhod k formirovaniyu prostranstva kollektivnoi informatsionnoi bezapasnosti stran BRIKS’; S. Sakulin, ‘Kontent-analiz informatsionnykh resursov rossiiskoi diaspori’, Obozrevatel 8 (2018) pp. 84–98.

103 ‘China Spins Tale That the U.S. Army Started the Coronavirus Epidemic’, The New York Times (13 March 2020) and ‘China Takes a Page From Russia’s Disinformation Playbook’, Axios (25 March 2020).